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M a n u s c r i p t 2 for an AIV outbreak in poultry farms. Thus exposure to AIV associated with PM 2.5 is 27 possible near to infected farms and may be a serious risk for fatal influenza disease 28 in both man and animals. Airborne transmission should be effectively preventable by 29 dispersion of water combined with disinfection into the inside air as well as the 30 exhaust air stream of AIV infected farms. 31
Introduction 36 37
Some of the most highly contagious viruses of human and veterinary concern are 38 airborne pathogens, e. g. human and avian influenza virus (AIV) and foot-and-mouth 39 disease virus (FMDV). The highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) have 40 been a threat to the poultry industry for many years. However, when the Asian H5N1 41 subtype emerged, a trans-boundary spread became evident and a new dimension of 42 zoonotic danger and fear for evolution of a pandemic virus was raised (Belshe, 2005; 43 Peiris et al., 2007; WHO, 2007) . After the first localized Asian H5N1 epidemic in 44 Germany, the virus was spread rapidly and caused many small epidemics in wild 45 birds. In 2007, the virus also was detected on duck raising farms (Rinder et al., 2007; 46 Starik et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2007; Harder et al., 2008) . The routes of 47 transmission of Asian H5N1 and other HPAI subtypes among susceptible mammals 48 and birds is still a matter of debate. Air borne transmission of infection cannot be 49 excluded and might be an effective way of infection transmission when virus is 50 inhaled directly in the deeper respiratory tract (Shinya et al., 2006; Tellier, 2006 ; 51 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t hemagglutination (HA) titer of 1:2048 in allantoic fluid from infected eggs, the titer in 79 MDCK-cells was 3 x 10 5 /ml TCID 50 . 80 81 2.2. Generation of a storable powder of chicken feces (PCF) 82
About 8 kg of fresh feces were sampled in a layer farm and analyzed by RT-qPCR to 83 be free of AIV genomes. To avoid bacterial or fungal infection of embryos careful 84 removal of these germs was necessary. Since filtration of feces suspensions can 85 cause an incalculable loss of spiked AIV by adsorption to micro filter membranes , it 86 was steam sterilized (20 min; +121 °C). Subsequently the material was dried at +70 87°C , ground and sieved very fine to a storable powder of chicken feces (PCF) with a 88 final particle size of < 63 µm. Approximately 51 % of PCF dry mass were water 89 soluble. 90 91
Generation and sampling of AIV contaminated fecal PM 2,5 92
Aliquots of PCF (50 g/l) were re-suspended in distilled water and supplemented with 93 5 ml/l AIV stock solution corresponding 10 8 EID 50 /g PCF. Comparable AIV 94 concentrations were found in fresh feces of infected birds (WHO, 2007) . The 95 AIV/PCF-suspension and compressed air (flow of 5 l/min) were used in an aerosol 96 generator (AGK 2000, Palas GmbH, Germany) for nebulization. Figure 1  97 demonstrates the aerosol generator and the generation of different air streams (A, B, 98 C) leading to the collection of PM 2,5 (stream A) on quartz microfiber filters. The 99 aerosol generator produced droplets with particle sizes < 15 µm diameter. In the new 100 developed mixing and drying chamber these droplets shrank to PM 2,5 . For this the 101 aerosol was diluted and dried with compressed air in a ratio of 1/6.6 (v/v). The 102 resulting air stream (38 l/min) was split in 3 parts in an isokinetic air stream splitter: 103 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 5 quartz microfiber filters (Type QF050-25, Pieper Filter GmbH, Germany; Average: 2 105 mg PM 2,5 /Filter in 3 min). Stream B (13 % or 5 l/min) for monitoring particle size 106 distribution and concentration inside the chamber. For this purpose, Stream B was 107 diluted by a factor of 10 in a dilution chamber (VKL-10E, Palas GmbH, Germany) and 108 analyzed with an aerosol spectrometer (welas 2000, Palas GmbH, Germany). 109
Stream C (3 % or 1 l/min) for exhaust air stream which finally collected all other air 110 streams. Exhaust air was heat treated (250 °C; > 10 s) and HEPA filtered before 111 release to the atmosphere to assure complete disinfection. PM 2,5 -dust coated filters 112 were stored at -70 °C (control temperature) before elution. 113 114
Incubation of AIV contaminated fecal PM 2,5 deposited on filters 115
AIV contaminated fecal PM 2,5 deposited on filters was exposed to various 116 combinations of incubation periods (0, 15 h, 48 h, 96 h), temperatures (-70, -20, +4, 117 +20, +37 and +50 °C) and humidity ("water-saturated", "normal atmosphere", and 118 "exsiccated dry"). "Water-saturated" means: dust-coated filters were exposed to 119 water-saturated air (RH 4°9 0 %, RH 20°6 0 %); "normal atmosphere" means: dust-120 coated filters were exposed to unchanged indoor air (RH 22°3 0%) and "exsiccated 121 dry" means: dust coated filters were exposed in silica gel dried air in an airtight jar 122 (RH 4°2 0 %, RH 20°1 9 %). At the end of the different incubation procedures, filters 123 were stored at -70 °C. 
Hemagglutination test 138
Filter elutes as well as allantoic fluids were analyzed for hemagglutinating activity. 139
Hemagglutination assays were carried out in V-bottomed microtiter plates using 50 µl 140 of 2.5 % suspensions of chicken red blood cells in PBS as described (O.I.E. 141
Terrestrial Manual, 2008). Fresh chicken blood was supplemented with 1.6 % sodium 142 citrate in sterile H 2 O and was centrifuged at 800 x g for 10 min at room temperature 143 to separate red blood cells. Thereafter, the cells were washed 3 times with PBS 144 before addition to the assay. 145 146
Reverse transcription quantitative real-time PCR (RT-qPCR) 147
Filters coated with AIV contaminated fecal PM 2,5 were eluted with 3 ml sterile PBS 148 solution (8.0 g/l NaCl; 0.2 g/l KCl; 1.44 g/l Na 2 HPO 4 ; 0.24 g/l KH 2 PO 4 ; pH 7.4) and Particle size distributions of resulting aerosols showed -with high conformity -179 maxima of particle numbers at 0.4 to 0.6 µm particle diameter ( Fig. 2a ) and maxima 180 of particle volumes (or masses) at 2 to 4 µm particle diameter (Fig. 2b ). More than 90 181 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 8 matter with a size range less than 2.5 µm (PM 2.5 ) which can directly enter the 183 alveolar part of the lungs (DFG, 2008) . 184
The aerosol generator produced very high concentrations of PM 2.5 : a flow of 38 l/min 185 aerosol with particle concentrations up to 30 mg/m³ could be maintained for several 186
hours. Up to 84 % of the aerosol particles could be collected on quartz microfiber 187 filters. Therefore sampling times of 3 min were sufficient to collect 2.1 mg (median In contrast, before egg inoculation, there were relatively high real time RT-qPCR ct 217 values in the filter elutes ranging from ct 25 to 36 which in no case resulted in a 218 positive hemagglutination (not shown). This demonstrates that a lack of 219 hemagglutination activity is not decisive for the absence of infectious AIV particles. It 220 became evident that normal atmosphere and exsiccated dry air each supported long 221 term viral infectivity in contrast to a water-saturated atmosphere. A 4 day incubation 222 at +4 °C under exsiccated air conditions did not destroy AIV infectivity (Table 1b grey  223 shaded). In one experiment, even after a 4 day incubation at +20 °C, the filter elute 224 still contained infective AIV that killed the embryos and their allantoic fluid showed a 225 low ct in real time RT-qPCR as well as hemagglutinating activity ( filter elutes before egg inoculation. After a 2 day incubation, the 1/100 dilution 237 marked the limit of infectivity in parallel to the storage control temperature of -70 °C 238 (Table 1a) real-time PCR and in addition performed viral particle count. They found that 87 % of 281 the exhaled particles were under 1 µm in diameter, and therefore suggested that fine 282 particle aerosols may play a role in human influenza transmission. 283
In this study, we collected avian influenza A virus (LPAI H10N7) from the air stream 284 in a new aerosol chamber by deposition of the fine particulate matter generated from 285 aerosolized spiked chicken feces on quartz microfiber filters. For the first time, a Page 12 of 28 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 12 particle size of PM 2.5 from fractionated AIV spiked chicken feces aerosol has been 287 used in infection experiments with embryonated eggs as a highly sensitive system for 288 viable AIV. For inoculation of living chicken embryos it was necessary to avoid non-289 specific toxic effects due to viable bacterial content of feces and filtration was not an 290 option due to incalculable losses of spiked virus. Therefore, a sterilized storable 291 powder of chicken feces (PCF) with a final particle size of < 63 µm was produced. In 292 contrast to other detection methods for AIV in untreated bioaerosol, e.g. 293 was to exclusively analyze the < 2.5 µm bioaerosol fraction (fine particulate matter -297 PM 2.5 ) trapped on quartz microfiber filters which are used in routine atmosphere air 298 quality monitoring programs. It became evident that the 3 ml elute of the filters 299 contained viral genome as well as infectious AIV when 10 8 EID 50 /g feces were 300 present in chicken feces powder before nebulization. Compared to this the -70 °C 301 storage control sample contained viable AIV in PM 2.5 dust deposited on filters in an 302 amount of 4 x 10 6 EID 50 /g PM 2.5 . The lack of hemagglutinating activity in filter elutes 303 could be a result of the relatively large elute volume (3 ml). Severe damage of the 304 hemagglutinin protein can be excluded since infectivity of AIV in filter elutes was not 305 affected. A homogenous size distribution of particle numbers and particle volumes 306 was achieved in fine particulate matter with the aerosol generator ( Fig. 2 a and b) . It 307 was obvious that quartz microfiber filters had no destructive effect neither on AIV 308 genome stability nor on infectivity within the calculated number of genome copies 309 and viable AIV/mg PM 2.5 settled on the filters. However, it should be noted that the 310 RT-qPCR assay detects only a small fragment of the entire AIV genome which might 311 be much more robust than the entire genome. In addition, the amount of viable A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 13 spiked virus was relatively high and the recovery rate of the system has not been 313 tested for a low virus dose spiked in feces. 314
Relative humidity (RH) has a great impact on droplet size and structural integrity of 315 particles in aerosol (Lowen et al., 2007; Verreault et al., 2008) . We therefore tested 316 three different RH conditions -normal indoor atmosphere, exsiccated dry air and 317
water-saturated atmosphere. The relative higher stability of AIV in exsiccated dry air 318 and normal indoor atmosphere was confirmed as described for orthomyxo-and 319 paramyxoviridae (Schaffer et al., 1976; Ijaz et al., 1985; Lowen et al., 2007) . 320
Temperatures above +4 º C are well known to have a negative impact on virus 321 infectivity (Ijaz et al., 1985; 1987) . Temperatures of +37 º C and +50 º C completely 322 abolished AIV infectivity in fine particulate matter after a 2 day filter incubation. 323
However, the AIV subtype H10N7 used in this study remained remarkably stable for 324 a period of even 4 days at +20 º C in exsiccated dry air and under normal indoor 325 humidity conditions. Differences in stability of aerosolized influenza A virus have 326 been reported indicating higher decay rates for human and swine strains compared 327 to avian viruses (Mitchell et al., 1968; 1972) . The presence of infectious AIV in fine 328 particulate matter originating from contaminated feces and its relative stability at +20 329 º C might explain the H5N1 infection of people in subtropical and tropical regions. As poultry farms are known to emit fine particulate matter (PM 2.5 and PM 10 ) which is 358 composed of the abrasions from feces and litter material, they are a potential risk for 359 airborne neighborhood infection. According to the results from a dispersion 360 calculation for a 120,000 animal broiler farm, assuming a worst case scenario for an 361 adult person, she/he could inhale up to 10 4 infectious AIV per day living in a nearby 362 settlement. The 50 % human infective dose by aerosol inoculation of influenza virus 363 M a n u s c r i p t 15 far the minimal infective dose of H5N1 for man has not been determined, however, it 365 is clear that inhalation of AIV contaminated dust aerosols should be avoided. It also 366 can be concluded that animals in a nearby poultry farm can become exposed and 367 potentially infected by inhalation of about 300 infectious AIV per day. This risk 368 assessment relies on the aerosol 50 % infective dose for hens which has been 369 estimated to be only 2 TCID 50 (Savatov et al., 2007) . 370
As recently demonstrated in the guinea pig model the formation of droplet nuclei is 371 important for virus transmission, and that high RH (80%) leads to an increase in size 372 of exhaled small droplets (< 5 µm) and also a rapid settling of large droplets limits the 373 spread of virus (Lowen et al., 2007) . In AIV affected poultry farms, culling actions and 374 subsequent cleaning of the stables can cause very high dust production and the 375 Comparison of size distribution of particle numbers (a) and particle volumes (b) of 529 fine particulate matter aerosols (PM 2.5 ) generated from suspensions of AIV spiked 530 
